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The CEO has an important role as a decision maker in the company and is 
responsible for the company's performance. This study was conducted to measure the 
effect of CEO on earnings management in 495 samples of non-financial companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2017-2019 using panel regression analysis 
with classical assumption testing. The results of panel regression examiners show that 
there is no significant effect between female CEOs and CEO turnover on earnings 
management proxies with discretionary accruals. Meanwhile, CEO tenure and 
company size show a significant negative relationship with earnings management. On 
the other hand, leverage and return on assets have a significant positive effect on 
earnings management. In addition, there is no significant influence between company 
age and Market to Book ratio on earnings management. 
Keywords: CEO characteristics, gender, tenure, CEO turnover. 
Abstrak 
CEO memiliki peran penting sebagai pengambil keputusan dalam perusahaan dan 
bertanggung jawab atas performa perusahaan. Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk 
mengetahui pengaruh karakteristik CEO terhadap manajemen laba pada 495 sampel 
perusahaan non-keuangan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia pada tahun 2017-
2019 dengan menggunakan analisis regresi panel dengan pengujian asumsi klasik. 
Hasil pengujian regresi panel menunjukkan tidak adanya pengaruh yang signifikan 
antara kehadiran CEO perempuan dan pergantian CEO terhadap manajemen laba 
yang diproksikan dengan discretionary accrual. Sedangkan masa kerja CEO dan 
ukuran perusahaan menunjukkan hubungan negatif yang signifikan terhadap 
manajemen laba. Di lain sisi, leverage dan Return on Asset berpengaruh positif secara 
signifikan terhadap manajemen laba. Selain itu, tidak adanya pengaruh yang signifikan 
antara usia perusahaan dan Market to Book ratio terhadap manajemen laba. 
Kata Kunci: Karakteristik CEO, Gender, Masa Kerja, Pergantian CEO. 
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INTRODUCTION 
CEO (Chief Executive Officer) is the "center" of policy in the company. 
Researchers, analysts, and the business media indirectly agree to view CEOs as the 
person who responsible and accountable for policies in a company (Dalton & Kesner, 
1995). In Indonesia, CEO is a part of the Board of Directors who is assigned the task 
of the shareholders to lead and determine the company's strategy1. The appointed 
CEO can control the authority over company decisions and be responsible for 
performance within the company (Chou & Chan, 2018). However, the pressure from 
shareholders can encourage CEO to take opportunistic actions and impair the stock 
holder in a company. In Indonesia, cases related to manipulation in the presentation of 
financial statements have also caught the public's attention, one of which is the 
presentation of the 2018 financial statements of Garuda Indonesia which violated 
PSAK and regulations set by the OJK, so that on June 28, 2019 the Ministry of 
Finance finally sanctioned the Board of Directors, commissioners, and issuers 
(DetikFinance.com, Laucereno, 2019). 
A CEO is selected and appointed in a different way from an ordinary employee, 
where the succession of members of the Board of Directors is carried out at the GMS 
(General Meeting of Shareholders), then the selection of a new CEO will consider the 
various interests of each shareholder by looking at the track record of the candidate. 
CEOs who work in the labor market will increase the incentive for them to demonstrate 
their abilities to market participants and avoid the penalties given. This situation can 
increase motivation for the CEO to sacrifice shareholder interests and defend his own 
interests (Jensen & Mecling, 1976). So that, CEO often practice earnings management 
(Baker, Collins, & Reitenga, 2009). 
1 Republic of Indonesia. 2007. Law No. 40 of 2007 concerning Limited Liability 
Companies. State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 2007, Number 106. State 
Secretariat. Jakarta. Article 1 Number 5 explains that the Board of Directors has full 
responsibility to carry out the management of the company and achieve the company's 
goals. 
Bouaziz et al. (2020) state that the characteristics of CEO and earnings 
management are topics that need to be investigated further, this is due to the authority 
and controlling value that the CEO has in making decisions within the company which 
can affect the quality of financial reporting. In accordance with the Upper echelons 
theory which states that the characteristics of CEO can affect the value of the 
company, the selection of the company's strategy, and the company's financial 
reporting decisions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). This is because the CEO's personality 
and experiences influence policy making on the interpretation of the situation they face 
(Hambrick, 2007). Research on the characteristics of the CEO, especially the gender 
of, the tenure, and turnover of the CEO can minimize earnings management and has 
become the subject of various studies with various results, but the concern is the lack 
of research related to the effect of CEO gender on earnings management (Alqatamin, 
Aribi). , & Arun, 2017). Therefore, in 2017, Alqatamin et al. conducted a study on how 
the influence of CEO characteristics on earnings management by considering the 
gender of the CEO at 1206 companies in Jordan. The result of this research is that the 
proportion of female CEO who lead a company does not affect the tendency of 
earnings management practices. 
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CEO performance can be reflected in the performance of the company he 
leads, especially the amount of profit reported by the company, so this condition will 
affect the incentives that the CEO will receive in the future (Gibbons & Murphy, 1992). 
The CEO will tend to overstate profits in the first year, so as if he shows his ability to 
manage the company and indirectly increases the CEO's career potential and 
compensation in the future, and the result is the CEO can avoid dismissal when 
shareholders are still not confident in his abilities (Ali & Zhang, 2015). On the other 
hand, there are research results that show a non-linear pattern, namely an inverted U 
pattern between the tenure of the CEO and earnings management. Related to this, the 
CEO is being conservative in managing revenue while managing the company in the 
initial period, then the CEO to be aggressive in managing income after working a few 
years later, so that the earnings management conducted by the CEO reach the 
maximum level in fifth and sixth years. When the CEO has reached the maximum 
point of earnings management, the CEO will return to be conservative and less 
aggressive in reporting the company's earnings (Hu, Hao, Liu, & Yao, 2015). 
In addition, controversy in research related to the influence of certain 
characteristics in CEO also occurs on the relationship between CEO turnover and 
earnings management. CEO turnover often have relevance to the poor performance of 
a company, as a result the new CEO tends to do " earnings bath ", which reduces 
corporate profits reported in the early period of his tenure with the aim of reducing the 
benchmark performance of these CEO (Bornemann, Kick, Pfingsten, & Schertler, 
2015). On the other hand, the research results of Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) did 
not find the effect of CEO turnover on earnings management practices. 
Therefore, the researcher wants to focus on the gender proportion, tenure and 
turnover of the CEO in non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) in 2017-2019. The results of this study are expected to expand 
previous research and assist companies in considering CEO characteristics, so as to 




REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
1. CEO Gender and Earnings management 
CEO gender will influence earnings management in a company. After the global 
financial crisis in 2008, gender diversity in key positions in companies became the 
public's attention (Lakhal, Nekhili, & Zouari, 2015). In a study conducted by Krishnan 
and Park (2005) by comparing companies run by male CEOs and those run by female 
CEOs, the results showed that male CEOs tend to manage companies properly like 
female CEOs. However, based on several research results that have been done, it 
shows that female CEOs tend to be more conservative and risk-averse, by avoiding 
risky investment and funding opportunities (Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2016; Schubert, 
2006). Gavious et al. (2012) also found that female CEOs are more likely to behave 
ethically, so that the presence of female CEOs can increase company value. Not only 
that, it was found that women also have a significant impact on corporate financial 
reporting, because earnings management performed by female CEOs is significantly 
lower than male CEOs. In addition, in gender theory it is said that women are more 
unbiased and conservative than men, so it can be concluded that gender in this case 
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refers to gender, namely men and women, have different characteristics thus they can 
have different influences in a company, because there are basic characters’ difference 
between men and women. Therefore, female CEOs tend to make more ethical 
decisions and as much as possible avoid managing accounting results. 
Furthermore, Setyaningrum et al. (2019) conducted a study in Indonesia that 
examined the influence of female executives on earnings management using data 
from companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) from 2013 to 2017. The 
results of this study found that female CEOs had a significant negative effect on 
earnings management, then a woman can reduce earnings management behavior in 
the company. This is because women are more careful, avoid risk and have higher 
ethical standards, consequently they can reduce motivation to carry out earnings 
management (Setyaningrum et al, 2019). In opposite, the effect of CEO gender on 
earnings management in companies in France was examined by Bouaziz et al. 
(Bouaziz et al., 2020) and the results showed that there was a negative and 
insignificant relationship between female CEOs and earnings management. In 
addition, based on research conducted by Setyaningrum et al. (Setyaningrum et al., 
2019), the researchers want to do research that is more focused on the gender of 
CEOs whether it has an impact on earnings management, if it is examined more 
thoroughly in all sectors (except finance) in companies listed on the IDX in the years 
2017-2019. Therefore, the hypothesis is formulated as follows:    
H1: The presence of female CEOs negatively affects earnings management 
practices. 
 
2. CEO Tenure And Earnings management 
CEO tenure will affect earnings management in the company. The tenure of the 
CEO is stated in POJK No. 33 / POJK.04 / 2014, Article 3 paragraph (2) and (3), which 
states that members of the Board of Directors are appointed for a certain term, where 
one term of office of members of the Board of Directors is no longer than 5 (five). 
years or until the closing of the annual GMS at the end of the 1 (one) term of office 
concerned. In addition, Article 40 of 2005 concerning Limited Liability Companies 
Article 94 paragraph (3) states that members of the Board of Directors are appointed 
for a certain period of time and can be reappointed. 
Along with the end of the CEO's tenure, it makes his career time horizon shorter. 
This causes the CEO to prefer a combination of explicit incentives (such as salary, 
pension package, last bonus, etc.) compared to implicit incentives (such as: the 
possibility of a post-retirement appointment) (Gibbons & Murphy, 1992). This shift in 
preference is caused by the CEO's desire to realize his incentives and be explicitly 
useful for his consumption after the end of his tenure 
As a form of bonding cost, shareholders use a compensation package that refers 
to the company's performance (Healy, 1985). Dechow and Skinner (2000) stated that 
the compensation package provided motivates managers to practice earnings 
management. Related research has also documented that compensation sensitivity to 
performance influences higher managers' earnings management practices (Healy, 
1985). This research views profit as still one of the performance indicators that is often 
used as a measure of compensation, regardless of its short-term period. In addition to 
maximizing compensation payments, managers perform earnings management at the 
end of the period to increase implicit compensation also, such as the possibility of 
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holding a post-retirement position (Gibbons & Murphy, 1992). By performing well in the 
final year of his tenure, the CEO will increase the likelihood of a higher career after 
stepping down. Thus, motivated by two incentives simultaneously, a CEO will try to 
increase the market value of his managerial labor at the end of his tenure. One of 
them is by implementing earnings management practices so that the last reported 
earnings before the end of their working period look good in the eyes of shareholders. 
Davidson et al. (2007) found that CEOs who are approaching retirement tend to 
do earnings management. This aims to obtain incentives in the form of bonuses, 
pension packages that can be used for consumption after the CEO's tenure ends 
(Davidson et al, 2007). Based on previous research, it was found that there was a 
positive influence between the tenure of the CEO and earnings management as 
measured by discretionary accruals. Therefore, the hypothesis formulated is as 
follows:  
H2: CEO tenure positively influences management practice profit. 
 
3. CEO Turnover and Earnings management 
 CEO turnover is one of the best ways to improve the performance of a company 
that is experiencing a decline. Choi et al. (2014) found that CEO turnover associated 
with poor company performance tends to affect earnings management. In these 
circumstances, the CEO tends to perform income increasing patterned earnings 
management to increase the nominal profit reported by the company with the aim of 
covering up the company's poor performance. In addition, Bornemann et al. 
(Bornemann et al., 2015) argued that the change of CEO resulted in a replacement 
CEO who had just served in a company undertaking an “earnings bath” pattern of 
earnings management, so the amount of discretionary expense in the first year tended 
to be higher than in subsequent years. This aims to blame the previous CEO's 
performance which is considered bad so that it can lower the CEO's performance 
benchmarks and also reduce the profit target that must be achieved for the next 
period. 
 In a study conducted by Wells (2002), it was found that non-routine CEO 
turnover caused by dismissal from office due to poor performance would be positively 
related to earnings management. This is because forced CEO turnover has 
implications for accounting policies within a company, including CEO incentives to 
manage accounting results (Wells, 2002). Based on the results of previous research, it 
was found that there was a positive influence between CEO turnover and earnings 
management as measured by discretionary accruals. Therefore, the hypothesis 
formulated is as follows: 
              H3: CEO turnover positively affects earnings management practices. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
The research sample was all companies, except the financial sector, which were 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2017 to 2019 with the following 
sampling criteria: (1) the company has a complete financial report and annual report 
during the research period, (2) the company uses rupiah currency. Based on these 
criteria, a sample of 744 companies was obtained. 
Research Model: 
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The dependent variable used was profit quality as measured by earnings 
management (DA). This study used discretionary accruals using the Raman and 
Shahrur (2008) model. The choice of this model was because the Raman and Shahrur 
models (Raman & Husayn, 2008) were an improvement from Kothari et al. (2005). 
Model modification was done by adding Book to Market Ratio to calculate total 
accruals. The absolute value of discretionary accruals was calculated by deducting 
total accruals from non-discretionary accruals. The model is written in the following 
notation: 
 
The CEO tenure variable (ACD) was measured by the number of years the CEO 
had held positions in a company. For example, if in a year there is a change of CEO 
and the effective date for the appointment of a new CEO is before the middle of the 
period (before 30 June), then that year is considered as the first year of the new CEO. 
Information regarding the effective date of the appointment of the CEO or the date of 
the GMS which decides the appointment of the CEO was obtained through the 
company's annual report. The CEO gender variable (GEN) measured using a dummy 
variable (Arun et al, 2015), ' 1 ' if the CEO concerned is female, '0' if the CEO is 
otherwise. The CEO turnover variable (TURN) is measured by a dummy variable 
(Cooper, 2017), ' 1 ' if the company changes its CEO in the previous year, ' 0 ' 
otherwise. The control variables used are company size (SIZE), company age (AGE), 




RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the study, with the number of research 
is 744 companies. In this study, the dependent variable used is discretionary accruals 
(DA). In the results of descriptive statistical calculations in the table above, the 
minimum and maximum values for DA are 0.0000667 and 0.615388, which are 
respectively found in the company Asiaplast Industries Tbk in 2019 and Lippo 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Var  N Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
DA 744 0.053138 0.038433 0.05872 6.67E-05 0.615388 
ACD 744 9.258065 5 9,813774 1 49 
GEN 744 0.081989 0 0.274533 0 1 
TURN 744 0.116935 0 0.32156 0 1 
SIZE 744 12,51956 12.49607 0.712634 10.67541 14.54649 
AGE 744 33.69758 32 17.0756 3 114 
LEV 744 0.509843 0.493994 0.358135 0.013623 4.370995 
ROA 744 0.034469 0.032731 0.107022 -0.67614 0.716023 
MTB 744 2.209116 1.197166 4.84278 -1.05794 85.18108 
 
The independent variables in this study consists of the ACD, GEN, and TURN 
variables. The first independent variable is ACD which is measured using the number 
of years the CEO has held his position in a company with the descriptive results 
shown in table 1.1 above. From the table, the minimum and maximum values for ACD 
are 1 and 49. Of the 744 samples there is only 1 company with a CEO who has served 
for the longest term of 49 years, the company is Ultra Jaya Milk Industry and Trading 
Company Tbk. in 2019. In addition, during the 2017 to 2019 period, there were 87 
companies with new CEOs who served for 1 year from the total sample. It can be 
concluded that most companies in the eight sectors except for the financial sector 
have CEOs with a relatively short tenure of 1 year. The CEO's tenure is in accordance 
with the provisions stated in POJK Number 33 / POJK.04 / 2014 and Law Article 40 of 
2005. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Dummy Variables GEN and TURN 
  GEN TURN 
1 61 8.20% 87 11.70% 
0 683 91.80% 657 88.30% 
Total 774 100% 771 100% 
 
The second independent variable is GEN which is measured using dummy 
variables with descriptive results shown in table 1.2. From these results, it is known 
that from the GEN variable there are 61 samples or 8.2% of the total sample of CEOs 
who are female. Meanwhile, as many as 683 samples or 91.8% of the total sample of 
CEOs were male. So that, most companies outside the financial sector have relatively 
few female CEOs. The third independent variable is TURN which is measured using a 
dummy variable with descriptive results shown in table 1. 2. By seeing the result, it is 
known that from the TURN variable there were 87 samples or 11.7% of the total 
sample of companies that changed the CEO of the previous year. Meanwhile, as many 
as 657 samples or 88.3% of the total sample of companies that did not change the 
CEO in the previous year or the CEO in the previous period served in the next period. 
In conclusion, the number of CEOs who changed from the CEO of the previous period 
is smaller when compared to the CEOs who remained in office from the previous 
period. 
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The Chow test is conducted to find a model that is more suitable between the 
Pooled Least Square (PLS) or Fixed Effect Model (FEM) models in panel regression. 
Based on the results of the Chow test which are reflected in table 3 above shows the 
value Prob. Cross-section F of 0.0000 is less than 0.05, so the Fixed Effect Model 
(FEM) is better to use than the Pooled Least Square Model (PLS). 
 
Table 3. Chow Test Results 
Effects Test Statistics  df Prob. 
Cross-section F 2.390649 -247,488 0 
Chi-square cross-section 589.993519 247 0 
 
Furthermore, Hausman test performed to determine a better model between 
Random Effects Model (REM) or Fixed Effect Model (FEM) in a panel regression. 
 
Table 4. Hausman Test Results 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistics Chi-Sq. df Prob. 
Random cross-
section 7.977623 8 0.4357 
 
The result of the Hausman test yields Prob. The random cross-section is 0.4357, 
so the Random Effect Model (REM) is more suitable than the Fixed Effect Model 
(FEM). Furthermore, the Lagrange Multiplier test was carried out to determine which 
model is more suitable between the Common Effect (OLS) or Random Effect (REM) 
model. This is because based on the Chow test, the Fixed Effect Model (FEM) is more 
suitable than the Pooled Least Square Model (PLS) . However, based on the 
Hausman test, the Random Effect Model (REM) is more suitable than the Fixed Effect 
Model (FEM). 
 
Table 5. Lagrange Multiplier Test Results 
  Hypothesis Test 
  Cross-section Time Both 
Breusch-Pagan 71,55077 1.246855 72,79763 
  0 -0.2642 0 
 
Lagrange Multiplier test shows the value of Prob. Breusch-Pagan is 0.0 000 so 
that the model Random Effect is better used instead of the model of Common Effect. 
Therefore, it is most appropriate to test panel regression data using the Random Effect 
model. 
Based on Table 6, the independent variable TURN was found to have a significant 
positive effect at the 0.05 level on DA with a significance value of 0.0373. In addition, 
there are two control variables that also have a significant effect at the 0.05 level on 
DA, namely SIZE and ROA. There is a significant negative effect in the SIZE variable 
on DA with a significance of 0.0203. In opposite, the ROA variable has a significant 
positive effect on DA with a significance of 0.0010. The partial test also shows that the 
GEN variable and two control variables, namely LEV and MTB, have a positive but 
insignificant effect on DA. 
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Table 6. Panel Regression Testing Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.169411 0.04966 3.411388 0.0007 
ACD -0.000169 0.000289 -0.585791 0.2791 
GEN 0.006597 0.00946 0.697363 0.2429 
TURN 0.011547 0.006465 1,7859 0.0373 
SIZE -0.009212 0.00396 -2.326371 0.0203 
AGE -0.00022 0.000173 -1.274219 0.2030 
LEV 0.006319 0.007702 0.820463 0.4122 
ROA 0.078961 0.02397 3.294136 0.0010 
MTB 9.11E-05 0.000593 0.15372 0.8779 
Adj R2 0.01983 
F-stat 2.8793 *** 
 
The results show that the presence of female CEOs has no effect on earnings 
manipulation, because the significant value is 0.2429, meaning that hypothesis one 
(H1) is rejected. These results are in line with the research of Peni and Vahamaa 
(2010), where female CEOs are not able to play a significant role in limiting and 
reducing the tendency of earnings management in companies. There is no significant 
effect of gender CEO on earnings management due to pressure from external parties, 
which is a factor that can affect the characteristics of female CEOs to make decisions 
regarding corporate financial reporting (Puspa & Adhariani, 2017). Alqatamin et al. 
(Alqatamin et al., 2017) and Krishnan and Park (Krishnan & Park, 2005) reveal that 
there is no relationship between the gender of the CEO on the effect of the quality of 
earnings reported by the company. The research results of Krishnan and Park 
(Krishnan & Park, 2005) found that male CEOs tend to manage companies properly 
like female CEOs. Powell and Ansic (1997) also stated that women are more likely to 
have attitudes that are more persuaded, less confident, less aggressive, and have low 
leadership and problem-solving skills when making decisions under risk. 
These results contradict the research of Bouaziz et al. (Bouaziz et al., 2020), 
Setyaningrum et al. (Setyaningrum et al., 2019), Faccio et al. (Faccio et al., 2016), 
Lakhal et al. (Lakhal et al., 2015), and Gavious et al. (Gavious et al., 2012) which 
revealed that CEOs gender differences will affect earnings management within the 
company. Basically, women's attitudes tend to be more ethical and risk - averse than 
men and have high morale, which can reduce earnings management. 
Hypothesis 2 is rejected because the ACD variable has a value of t -0.5857 with a 
significance level above five percent. These results are in line with the research results 
of Bouaziz et al. (Bouaziz et al., 2020) which revealed there is no significance on 
tenure CEO towards earnings management. Bouaziz et al. (2020) stated that the 
longer the CEO has served in the company, the more likely he will be serious and 
focused on improving the company's situation and choose to contribute to the 
company's growth and strive to develop the business rather than the CEO with a short 
tenure. Bergh (2001) in (Bouaziz et al, 2020) stated that the longtime CEO of a 
company has a wide range of experience in managing the company, so the CEO with 
a long service life are likely to affect the success in running the company. Ali and 
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Zhang (Ali & Zhang, 2015) tested the tenure of CEOs on earnings management 
practices, then found that CEOs tend to do income maximization patterned earnings 
management in the first year the CEO served in the company, because new CEOs 
generally have the motivation to demonstrate their abilities to shareholders at the 
beginning of their working period. In this case, the new CEO of a company wants to 
influence the market's assessment of his abilities in the early years of his tenure. 
Gibbons and Murphy (Gibbons & Murphy, 1992) also revealed that shareholders do 
not know with certainty the ability of the newly appointed CEO in a company, thus it 
takes the ability of the CEO to convince market perceptions of the CEO's ability. 
Results were contrary to research Solihah and Herawaty (2019) who find there is a 
positive influence between CEO tenure of the earnings management. Because the 
CEO's tenure is longer, indicating that the CEO has a good performance so he can 
build a good reputation in front of shareholders because of his skills in managing the 
company. Davidson et al. (Davidson et al., 2007) found that CEOs who are about to 
retire tend to do earnings management. This aims to obtain incentives in the form of 
bonuses, pension packages that can be used for consumption after the CEO's tenure 
ends. 
The TURN variable shows a significant value of 0.0373, which means that CEO 
turnover in the company has a positive effect on earnings management at the 0.05 
level, thus hypothesis three (H3) is accepted. In line with the research results of 
Bornemann (Bornemann et al., 2015) and Hazarika et al. (2012). Previous research 
conducted in 1.895 companies in the ExecuComp database from 1992 to 2004 found 
that forced CEO turnover was positively related to earnings management. Wells 
(Wells, 2002) conducted a study of 100 companies listed on the Australian Security 
Exchange (ASX) from 1984 to 1994. The results of this study found that CEOs who 
had recently served in companies tended to carry out earnings management with a 
taking a bath pattern. 
These results contradict the research of Bouaziz et al. (Bouaziz et al., 2020) where 
there is no significant influence between CEO turnover on earnings management. 
Murphy and Zimmerman (Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993) suggest that CEO turnover 
tends to be done when the company's performance is poor or when the previous CEO 
is approaching retirement. 
Choi et al. (Choi et al., 2014) argue that routine CEO turnover will cause new 
CEOs to be less involved in earnings management, because the successors to 
previous CEOs tend to have a variety of knowledge and experience in managing the 
company, and previous CEOs generally continue to monitor the performance of the 
newly appointed CEO, so as to minimize moral hazard and reduce opportunities for 
the new CEO to do earnings management. In addition, the forced dismissal of the 
CEO also has no effect on earnings management because the change tends to be 
related to financial problems or business restructuring, thereby increasing public 
supervision of the company. 
SIZE (company size) has a significant negative effect on earnings management, 
meaning that the larger the company size, the internal controls contained in the 
company will be more sophisticated. The company’s age (AGE) has no effect on 
earnings management in the company. This result may be due to a better market 
reputation and compliance with applicable regulations compared to companies that are 
just starting out. Leverage (LEV) also did not give any effect on earnings management. 
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The fourth control variable, Return on Assets (ROA) has a significant effect on 
earnings management. This can be explained because management will tend to carry 
out income maximization patterned earnings management when the company's 
performance is poor. Conversely, the practice of income minimization pattern earnings 
management is carried out when the company's performance is above the profit target 
expected by the stockholders. Finally, the Market to Book Ratio (MTB) affects the 
company's earnings management. Basically, a higher share price will encourage 
management within the company to carry out earnings management with the aim that 




This study examines non-financial companies listed on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange for the 2017-2019 period that match the specified sample criteria. This 
study did not find a significant effect of the presence of female CEO and CEO tenure 
on earnings management. This is based on the attitude of women who tend to be 
easily persuaded, lack self-confidence, less aggressive, and have low leadership and 
problem-solving skills when making decisions under risk. This causes women to tend 
to follow the flow in the company. Although women tend to be ethical, when there is 
pressure from external parties, this can affect the characteristics of female CEO to 
make decisions related to corporate financial reporting. There is no significant effect 
between the tenure of the CEO and earnings management. This is because CEOs 
with long tenure in the company tend to be more serious and focus on improving the 
company's situation and choose to contribute to the company's growth and strive to 
develop the business rather than CEO with short tenure. In addition, new CEO tend to 
have the motivation to demonstrate their abilities to shareholders at the beginning of 
their tenure, with the aim of influencing market judgments about their abilities in the 
early years of their tenure, because shareholders do not know with certainty the ability 
of the newly appointed CEO in a company. On the other hand, there is a significant 
influence between CEO turnover on earnings management. This is because the CEO 
who has just served in the company tends to do earnings management by taking a 
bath to blame the performance of the previous CEO and reduce the performance 
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